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The process of diagnostic reasoning contains a sequence of intellectual "stations"
through which a patient's manifestations are transferred en route to the diagnostic
entities that emerge as explanatory conclusions. The previous paper of this series
(1) contained an account of the domains, disorders, derangements, and other en-
tities that act as "stations" during the directional sequence of the reasoning. In
this paper, I shall try to indicate the way in which the transfers through these "sta-
tions" are effected by a rational series of intermediate decisions that are commonly
subsumed under the name of judgment.
A. CHOICE OF PERTINENT MANIFESTATIONS
Although statistical and computer approaches to diagnosis begin with a collec-
tion of "input" data, some of the fundamental decisions of diagnostic reasoning
occur long before any data are selected as "input" to the analytic process.
1. Authentication of Evidence
Since an act of perception and description is required for an observed entity
to be converted into "data," the clinician's first main decisions involve the authen-
ticity of the basic evidence that constitute the data with which he plans to think.
In the information that constitutes demographic and symptomatic data, a stimu-
lus, sensation, or event had to be perceived by a patient, described by that patient,
perceived by a receptor "apparatus" (which is usually a physician), and converted
into a descriptive statement. Errors can occur at each step in this procedure: the
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patient may be unreliable or uncommunicative; the doctor may be imperceptive,
failing to ask or note enough; the doctor may be overzealous, using leading ques-
tions or badgering questions to maintain the preconceptions that elicit a "typical"
but inaccurate history; or an inanimate recipient of information, such as a printed
form or a computer, may be confusing to the patient or inadequate for the expres-
sion of subtle details.
In the physical examination, a sign is noted when certain sensory stimuli have
passed from the observed entity to the doctor's cerebral recognition. Errors can
occur before these stimuli reach the doctor's mind because of sensory defects in
his vision, hearing, or palpation, or because he may fail to examine certain regions.
Alternatively, despite satisfactory sensory receptors and apparently complete ex-
amination, the doctor's cerebration may still fail to recognize and identify such
entitfes as a faint aortic diastolic murmur or peripheral retinopathy.
In paraclinical data, the opportunities for error are enhanced by the many inter-
mediate steps that occur as a substance derived from a patient is transported to
its locale of examination, processed there, and eventually transformed into a report
in the patient's record. The substance may have been taken from the wrong patient,
given a wrong label, or sent to the wrong laboratory. In the laboratory, or other
locale of examination, defects may have existed in the test itself, in the apparatus,
in the reagents, in the criteria for appraisal, or in the human appraiser. The reported
result may have been distorted as it underwent various transcriptions before reach-
ing the patient's record.
At this elemental stage of data gathering, therefore, a careful clinician will ar-
range to verify the basic facts before any other reasoning begins.
2. Designation of Evidence
Although symptoms and signs are sometimes regarded as the fundamental ele-
ments of clinical data (2), these entities are actually "diagnoses" that represent
labels or designations given to the basic observations that were just described. For
example, a patient seldom reports the symptom of pleuritic pain; the patient may
say that he gets a stabbing sensation in his chest when he takes a deep breath,
and the doctor then designates this event with the symptom name of pleuritic pain.
Similarly, the "signs" of petechiae, apical holosystolic murmur, and basilar dullness
are interpretations of the fundamental observations or sensations encountered by
the doctor during physical examination.
Many of the problems in making these decisions of designation or interpretation
have been discussed elsewhere (3). The sources of error include: for symptoms,
the failure of the doctor and patient to communicate in meaningful or precise terms
(e.g., what does a patient or doctor mean by gas pain, dyspepsia, or heartburn?);
and, for signs, the doctor's inaccuracy in interpreting the sensations (e.g., calling
a systolic murmur diastolic) or the doctor's neglect of alternative causes for the
observed evidence (e.g., designating a palpable rectus muscle as liver, or a pul-
monary wheeze as a pleural rub).
3. Contemplation of Deviance
After the observed evidence has been designated, the clinician's next step is to
decide which entities are sufficiently deviant from the accepted range to be called
"abnormal." These decisions involve the answers to such questions as: when is
a palpable liver not enlarged; which systolic murmurs are physiologic; how much
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shortness of breath is dyspnea; how high is tachypnea, hypertension, or leukocyto-
sis and how low is bradycardia, oliguria, anemia, or thrombocytopenia?
The problems of establishing an appropriate range of normal for clinical and
paraclinical data are beyond the scope of this discussion, but the main point to
be noted here is that such ranges have not been established in a scientifically satis-
factory manner for many critical topics in medical data (3). A prime source of
difficulty is not in clinical observation or in laboratory technology, but in epi-
demiologic sampling. The populations used for assessing the "normal range" of
most laboratory tests have been inadequate in their range of age, race, sex, ethnic
groups, and other demographic features. In addition, a major controversy exists
about whether the idea of "normal" should be decided according to biologic health
or statistical calculation (4, 5). For the calculation, statisticians still debate whether
"abnormal" should be measured according to percentiles of a distribution, or dis-
tance from a mean (6, 7); and clinicians are uncertain about either form of meas-
urement in the absence of satisfactory long-term follow-up data to demonstrate that
the measured "abnormality" in statistics represents a pathologic outcome in bio-
logic "disease."
4. Consideration of Pertinence
After all these decisions have been made about the assembled information, the
clinician then determines which normal or abnormal findings will be ignored, and
which ones will receive further attention. Among the abnormal findings that might
be ignored are an asymptomatic ingrown toenail or an ocular cataract that has
produced no visual symptoms. Among the normal findings that might receive major
attention are "pertinent negatives" used to support or refute certain other evidence.
Thus, the maintenance of customary weight is a "normal" but contradictory finding
in a patient who claims to have had profound anorexia for a long period of time;
and the absence of appropriate exposure suggests a cause other than psittacosis
in a patient with viral pneumonia.
Certain findings may have therapeutic pertinence even though the findings are
either normal, or not subjected to diagnostic investigation. For example, a struc-
turally and functionally normal nose or breast may be esthetically unsatisfactory
to the patient, and may thereby be subjected to plastic surgery. A hospitalized pa-
tient nmay be treated for constipation, insomnia, or anxiety although these symp-
tomatic discomforts may not receive further diagnostic assessment. In certain
urgent circumstances, such as severe gastrointestinal hemorrhage or acute pul-
monary edema, appropriate ad hoc treatment may be given before or while the
diagnostic procedures continue.
After the pertinent findings have been selected, the clinician has assembled the
list of manifestations with which "formal" diagnostic reasoning can begin.
These four activities may seem so obvious to a well-functioning clinician that
he may be impatient with their detailed discussion. Nevertheless, perhaps because
they seem so obvious, the prediagnostic decisions are constantly overlooked both
during the training of medical students and during the composition of computer
programs that attempt to achieve automated diagnosis. The medical student often
fails to develop a rigorous rational discipline of the bedside because he is taught
to think precisely about the "basic" morphologic, physiologic, biochemical, or
molecular explanations for clinical phenomena, but he may receive no comparable
intellectual instruction for the challenge of determining the basic authenticity, desig-
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nation, deviance, and pertinence of the elemental data that identify the explained
phenomena. In the absence of such a specific scientific discipline, the student learns
to make the decisions by intuitive, judgmental, or other nondescript methods that
he later, as a consultant physician, cannot specify when he tries to describe the
diagnostic process to medical students, statisticians, or computer programmers.
Consequently, the computer or card-sorting programs developed for history-taking,
and the statistical procedures developed for diagnostic "reasoning," may be grossly
distorted and oversimplified, producing defective data and defective reasoning.
B. THE PROCESS OF SUBSEQUENT SELECTIONS
As diagnostic reasoning proceeds in the search for the "immediate cause" (8)
that connects one phenomenon to the next, the clinician will constantly evaluate
sets of candidates from which to make choices. The process of including and subse-
quently excluding candidates in such sets is often described with the phrase "rule
out."
After all the appropriate candidates are assembled in the set, the merits of the
first candidate are evaluated, and the candidate is either kept in the set or "ruled
out." The next candidate then receives similar considerations, and the process con-
tinues until all candidates have been evaluated. If more than one candidate remains
after this first appraisal of the entire set, the "survivors" are now reevaluated both
in relation to the role for which they compete, and in relation to one another.
The iteration of these appraisals continues until all candidates but one have been
excluded. The one that remains is selected.
The selection process for each decision in diagnostic reasoning thus contains
at least three distinct components: a set of candidates; a mechanism for "nominat-
ing" or including candidates in the set; and a mechanism for excluding or "ruling
out" all but the ultimate choice.
1. Formation of Sets
The set assembled for each decision will vary according to the entity about which
the decision is being made. Some of the sets will be topographic, containing a list
of anatomic structures or physiologic functions. Other sets will be explicatory, con-
taining lists of disorders, derangements, and other abnormalities that are regarded
as "immediate causes" for the antecedent entity.
Since a manifestation must be explained by citation of both a domain and a
disorder, at least two different sets will be assembled for each manifestation. As
the domains are considered, a third set of candidates may be assembled to select
a focus within each domain. For example, the topographic set for the manifestation,
epigastric pain, will consist of all domains that might be the source of this manifes-
tation. In this case, the candidate domains would be the chest and the abdomen.
The topographic set for each of these domains would consist of all focal structures
(heart, esophagus, pleura, etc., and stomach, duodenum, liver, pancreas, etc.) that
compose the domain. The explicatory sets for the manifestation would consist of
all the disorders that can occur at these focal structures. Such disorders in this
case would include muscular spasm, mucosal irritation, etc.
A set can be named according to the entity to which it refers. Depending on
the way the sets are used, the names can refer either to the contents of the set,
or to the entity explained by the set. A domain set contains its constituent foci.
Thus, the domain set of the gastrointestinal channel contains all the structures ex-
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tending from the mouth to the anus through such intermediaries as stomach and
intestines. Examples of other domain sets were discussed previously (1) when do-
mains and foci were initially defined. A primary disorder set consists of all the
disorders than can explain a manifestation in a particular domain; and the set is
usually named after the manifestation. Thus, the tachypnea set would contain all
disorders that can produce tachypnea. A secondary disorder set consists of all the
disorders or derangements that can cause a primary disorder, and the set is named
according to the primary disorder. Thus, the cardiomegaly set would contain such
disorders as acute cardiac dilatation and such derangements as rheumatic heart
disease.
2. Implications of Manifestations
The first major step in diagnostic reasoning is to assemble the sets of domains,
foci, and disorders that can account for a manifestation. Because of preclinical
training in gross anatomy, in histopathology, and in those aspects of physiology,
biochemistry, and microbiology that remain important for explaining gross disorders
of structure and function, a clinician can usually immediately choose the domains
that are implied by a patient's manifestations.
Certain manifestations will regularly imply an affected organ; thus, the eye is
implicated by ocular pain; the larynx, by hoarseness; and the bladder, by dysuria.
Certain manifestations point to a region; such symptoms as pain in the head, neck,
chest, abdomen, or back, and such physical signs as lower thoracic percussive dull-
ness, precordial thrills, distention of abdomen, and swelling of a leg all imply a
problem in the associated regions. The involvement of a channel is suggested by
such symptoms as cough, vomiting, dysmenorrhea, and diarrhea, and by such signs
as distended neck veins, absent arterial pulsations, and abnormal appearances of
sputum, urine, feces, etc. Other symptoms or signs are referred to systems. De-
lirium (sensorial system), hypertension (cardiovascular system), dyspnea (cardio-
pulmonary-vascular-hemic system), fever (body as a whole), and edema (cardio-
vascular-metabolic system) are examples of manifestations and of their associated
systems.
3. Inclusion and Exclusion of Candidates
As described elsewhere (9), some of the main errors of diagnostic reasoning
arise during the processes of including and excluding candidates. With errors of
omission, the diagnostician does not include enough candidates when he assembles
his list. With errors of commission, his exclusions are defective, leading to a wrong
choice or to an unnecessary choice.
Some of the errors occur late in the reasoning process, as the clinician nears
the goal of a diagnostic entity, but many others occur early, during the evaluation
of manifestations. Among the most common types of error are those that occur
when the clinician makes a peremptory decision, leaping to the choice of a particu-
lar candidate without contemplating or giving adequate weight to all the alternative
possibilities.
a. Errors of omission. An error of omission in the diagnostic analysis of a chan-
nel often occurs when a manifestation at one end of the channel is ascribed to
a nearby structure in the channel, without consideration of the possibility that the
true source is more distant. Thus, the signs and symptoms of peripheral arterial
disease may be attributed to disease of small vessels because the peripheral pulses
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are not palpable, but the actual difficulty may lie higher in the arterial channel,
at the aortic bifurcation. Similarly, rectal bleeding may be attributed to hemor-
rhoids or a rectal lesion, without contemplation of diverticula or of lesions located
higher in the colon or intestine. A stroke may be ascribed to an intracerebral vascu-
lar difficulty, and a lesion of the carotid artery may be overlooked.
In dealing with a region, the diagnostician may neglect to consider all the re-
gional constituents and may concentrate instead only on those that are commonly
associated with the observed manifestation. For example, a rub or murmur oc-
curring in the region of the anterior chest may be immediately assigned to a focus
in the heart, and the pleura or great vessels may be neglected as possible sources.
When the abnormal function of a system is appraised, the diagnostician may
not include all of the physiologic elements that normally enter the activity of the
system. For example, the role of metabolic protein products in maintaining the
homeostasis of extracellular fluid may be ignored in a patient who has edema. Con-
sequently, the edema may be attributed to a disorder in the cardiovascular system,
and a hypoproteinemic cause may be overlooked.
b. Errors of disorientation. Errors of this type occur when the clinician, regard-
less of completeness in his list of candidates, becomes oriented toward the wrong
candidate.
The choice of a region may be disoriented when the diagnostician forgets about
the previously (1) described diaphragmatic distortions, channel transmissions, and
neurologic peculiarities that can cause a manifestation to appear at a site remote
from its provocative source. In these circumstances, to account for the observed
manifestation, the diagnostician may need to identify at least two different sequen-
tial disorders in two different domains. For example, to account for the manifesta-
tion of hoarseness, the first explanatory disorder might be a paralysis of vocal
cord; the next explanatory disorder would then be moved to a different location
and listed as intramediastinal compression of the recurrent laryngeal nerve.
Without a constant awareness of such patterns of referral, the diagnostician
observing a manifestation in a particular region may restrict his focus to organs
in that region, and may fail to contemplate a more remote region that may be
the true source of the difficulty. In this way, ascites may be ascribed to a hepatic
disorder although caused by congestive heart failure; scapular pain due to gall-
stones may receive orthopedic attention; the pain of a myocardial infarction may
be attributed to indigestion; and the manifestations of Homer's syndrome, caused
by apical lung cancer, may be "worked-up" for a brain tumor.
Even when the proper region has been selected and all its constituents consid-
ered, the investigator may choose the wrong focus within the region because he
neglects the capacity of the correct focus to cause the manifestation. For example,
when a patient has inspiratory pain in the chest, the diagnostician may consider
such foci as rib, pleura, and pericardium, and may exclude the muscles of the chest
wall because he may forget that a strained muscle can produce inspiratory pain.
C. THE CORRELATION OF STRUCTURE, FUNCTION,
AND EXPLANATION
Although inspection, palpation, roentgenography, and diverse paraclinical tests
may demonstrate an anatomic lesion, structural evidence can never alone provide
explanations for the functional phenomena that occur as symptoms. Thus, the find-
ings of cardiomegaly or narrowed coronary vessels may not account for chest pain;
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the demonstration of gallstones does not necessarily explain abdominal pain; osteo-
arthritis may not be the cause of back pain; and an abnormal frontal sinus need
not account for headache.
Even when the morphologic evidence shows the actual lesion that produces the
symptoms of a functional disorder, a mere citation of the lesion does not explain
the functional process by which the symptom is produced. For example, an ana-
tomic narrowing of the mitral valve does not account for enlargement of the left
atrium unless the obstruction has been hemodynamically significant; a stone in the
common bile duct does not usually account for complete occlusion of the duct
unless the irritated mucosa has become inflamed or edematous.
In addition to correlating structure and function, the diagnostician must further
determine whether a well-correlated lesion and dysfunction provide satisfactory ex-
planations for an observed clinical manifestation. Thus, a stenotic mitral valve pro-
ducing significant hemodynamic obstruction may cause enlargement of the left
atrium, but none of these correlated lesions and dysfunctions of the heart accounts
for the manifestation of dyspnea unless additional abnormalities are invoked in
the lungs or elsewhere.
The obligation to correlate and to explain is one of the most crucial aspects
of clinical reasoning, because the correlated explanations are often more important
for therapeutic decisions than in choices of diagnostic names. Thus, the clinician
may make an accurate diagnosis of gallstones, but if the diagnosed gallstones do
not account for the abdominal pain, a cholecystectomy will not solve the patient's
problem. Similarly, the clinician may correctly diagnose and correlate mitral steno-
sis, left atrial enlargement, and atrial fibrillation, but if these disorders do not ac-
count for a patient's fatigue, cardiac surgery might be a futile procedure.
The necessity for correlated explanation as a prelude to therapeutic decisions
is one of the main distinctions between diagnostic reasoning in a living patient
and diagnostic reasoning at a clinicopathologic conference (CPC). Suppose the
patient chosen for CPC had had the manifestations of jaundice, ascites, and bloody
stools. If the clinical discusser at the CPC concludes that the patient had both
hepatic cirrhosis and rectal carcinoma, and if the pathologist later confirms that
both diseases were present, the clinician leaves the conference a "winner." In a
living patient, however, these diagnostic identifications would have been inade-
quate, since they do not alone provide enough explanation of the manifestations
to enable a choice of therapy. In the patient just cited, the hepatic cirrhosis may
have been quiescent, with all of the manifestations caused by metastatic cancer of
the rectum; conversely, the cirrhotic liver may have been decompensated and re-
sponsible for all of the observed manifestations, with the rectal carcinoma having
been localized, asymptomatic, and discovered by "accident" during the routine
physical examination. Thus, in two patients with exactly the same major manifesta-
tions and exactly the same disease diagnoses, the estimation of prognosis and
choice of treatment would have been greatly affected by the decisions made during
the correlated explanation of disorders (10).
The correlation of form, function, and explanation involve a subtle interplay
of data and reasoning for the different domains of clinical macrobiology.
1. Regions
In dealing with functional manifestations in a region, the diagnostician must con-
sider all the foci within that region, and must decide which ones can produce the
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phenomenon that has been observed. With this type of reasoning, augmented by
additional data from the history or physical examination, certain structures and
explanations can be included or excluded from consideration.
For example, suppose the manifestation to be explained is pain in the chest. The pain-pro-
ducing structures in this region are skin, subcutaneous tissue, muscles, nerves, bones, pleura,
pericardium, myocardium, esophagus, aorta, pulmonary artery, or the upper parts of the
splenic and hepatic capsules. A worsening of the pain with inspiration would tend to rule
out skin, subcutaneous tissue, nerves, myocardium, aorta, and pulmonary artery. An onset
of the pain after trauma, and an appropriately localized anatomic site, suggest muscle or
rib. If pressure on the rib evokes no pain, and if isometric contraction of the suspected
muscle does evoke pain, then the muscle appears to be the source of the pain, regardless
of what the roentgenogram may show.
In dealing with a topographic type of regional manifestation, the diagnostician
may not always be able to rely on the availability of roentgenograms, or the
roengenographic findings may not explain the observed manifestations. Accord-
ingly, the reasoning should contain a careful anatomic evaluation of the region.
Suppose the manifestation to be explained is unilateral basilar thoracic dullness. The
first step in the reasoning is not a leap to a morphologic explanation in the lungs, but
a realization that dullness implies a failure of the resonant thoracic response on percussion.
Consequently, the first step is to rule out extrapulmonic causes for this abnormal response.
The percussion technique may have been poor; a unilateral tumor of the chest wall may
block the transmission of the thump; or the intrathoracic space ordinarily occupied by
aerated lung may be usurped by upward displacement of liver (on the right side) or by
massive cardiac enlargement (on the left). The next step, proceeding inward from extrapul-
monic sources, is to rule out pleural causes. If the transmission of resonance is blocked
by a pleural effusion, the transmission of breath sounds or fremitus should also be blocked.
Thus, if the breath sounds and fremitus are unimpaired, an effusion is unlikely. Finally,
the reasoning reaches the pulmonary parenchyma. Is air failing to enter the parenchyma,
due to a block in the tracheobronchial channel, or failing to disseminate, due to consolidation
caused by atelectasis, inflammation, or tumor? If consolidation is suspected, appropriate physi-
cal findings in breath sounds and fremitus can serve to confirm the decision.
2. Channels
The anatomic continuity of a channel simplifies the list of structures to be con-
sidered as the focus for a manifestation. At the same time, however, modern oppor-
tunities to inspect channels endoscopically or with radiographic opacification have
made clinicians rely heavily on these paraclinical tests for demonstrating localiza-
tion of lesions.
For the gastrointestinal channel, in particular, diagnosticians will often order supplementary
paraclinical tests immediately after the reasoning has reached the first disorder "station."
For example, the manifestation of hematemesis implies bleeding from the upper GI channel
above the ligament of Treitz. (A swallowed hemoptysis or nasooropharyngeal bleeding should
have been first ruled out by history-taking and physical examination before the manifestation
was designated as hematemesis). The possible foci in the upper GI channel are the esophagus,
stomach, duodenum, and jejunum. Since the hematemesis alone has no characteristics that
can localize it, the reasoning now shifts to a search for the derangement that might be
causing a disorder at the candidate sites. Cutaneous or palpatory manifestations of hepatic
cirrhosis would provide supportive evidence for a lesion in the esophagus; a history of
postprandial pain relieved by alkali would support the stomach or duodenum as the site
of the bleeding; and the existence of a postoperative dumping syndrome is consistent with
a bleeding lesion in the jejunum or gastrojejunal stoma-but none of these contemplations
can produce an unequivocal conclusion. For precise anatomic diagnosis, endoscopy or roent-
genography, or both, will be employed to demonstrate the location of the lesion.
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3. Systems
Because many different systems can be the cause of a single manifestation, the
diagnostic "review of systems" may become an intricate exercise in reasoning. In
particular, before a decision is reached at the disorder "station," the diagnostician
may have conducted many excursions into derangement "stations," searching ex-
planations for the candidate disorders.
Consider an example of reasoning for the manifestation of dyspnea. Dyspnea is not likely
to be due to the disorder of anemia if the patient shows no pallor to confirm the anemia;
and anemia can be ruled out by a paraclinical test. If the patient is cyanotic, but has
no auscultatory evidence of congenital heart disease, the dyspnea is probably not due to
a cardiac disorder. A lung disorder becomes likely if the dyspnea is better when the patient
reclines rather than sits. In the absence of a history or other findings suggestive of a pulmonary
derangement, the dyspnea is probably due to a cardiac disorder.
In a patient with fever, the first domain "station" is the body as a whole. As a specific
focus is then sought within that domain, the derangement of inflammation is initially sought
in the common locations of respiratory and urinary channels. The next most common locations,
such as abdomen and heart, might then be considered. If no inflammatory focus is found,
the consideration may shift to sources of reaction for the body as a whole. Such sources
might include a nonspecific viral infection, a drug reaction, or both.
D. CLUSTERING
Clustering, a common procedure in diagnostic reasoning, occurs as the result
of a decision to combine several different entities and to seek a common name
or explanation for them, rather than to deal with each individually.
Such combinatorial tactics have been used for centuries in medical nosology to
create the diagnostic entities called syndromes. As defined by Durham (11), a
syndrome is "a concurrence or running together of constant patterns of abnormal
signs and symptoms." Many syndromes have, therefore, been created as acts of
descriptive rather than explanatory diagnosis, and the use of a single name for
the syndrome has been an act of linguistic convenience to provide an "abbreviated"
label for the concordance of multiple entities.
Despite occasional claims (12) that "the syndrome has as its philosophic basis, not specific
disease factors but a chain of physiological processes," syndromes have been collected and
christened in diverse, inconsistent ways. The name may be based on an aggregate of observed
clinical manifestations (oculocerebrorenal syndrome), or on the most prominent of the overt
manifestations (dum7lpinig syndrotmie; stifi-mzant synldromiie). Whenever a specific underlying
lesion can be identified, the nomenclature may reflect the location of that lesion (carpel
tuiinnel synidrome; superior mediastinial syndromne). Other names are derived from biochemical
or metabolic abnormalities (hlemttolyticuremic syndrome; syndromize of inappropriate vasopressin
secretioni) or from such "etiologic" entities as a drug (thialidomide syntdrome), an operation
(postpericardiotomizy synidromole), an accident (cri sli syndrome), a hobby (motorcycle syni-
dr-ome), or the site of a gastronomic adventure (Chlinese restauiri-ant syndrome). The name
"syndrome" has even been applied to an isolated radiographic finding (emlpty sella syndrome)
that has no associated clinical or functional abnormalities.
When a simple designation cannot provide an appropriate description of the phenomena,
an eponymn is generally used. Medicine is rich in these eponymic citations, which usually
commemorate the physicians who first described the syndrome (Kliniefelter syndromize; Felty
syndrome), but in recent years, the syndrome may be named after the patients who were
its victims (Mast syndrome), or literary characters who bore resembling features (Munzchau.sen
syndclrom1e; Harlequinl syndrome; Pickvwickian syndrome) (13).
Because the term syndrome is so nonspecific and has many connotations other
than the ones I should like to discuss here, I shall use the word cluster for a group
of entities that have been combined for a common diagnostic name or explanation.
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I. Types of Clusters
a. Dependent. A dependent cluster is composed of several entities that are
drectly connected in a cause-and-effect sequence, with each entity having pre-
sumably led to the next. Examples of such dependent clusters are the sequence of
anorexia -> weight loss .-- fatigue, which commonly occurs in cancer or chronic
infections. Another example is polyuria -> polydipsia in patients with uncontrolled
glycosuria, or polydipsia -> polyuria in patients with ingestion of excess fluid.
b. Independent. An independent cluster comprises entities that have not led to
each other, and that presumptively have a common underlying cause. Examples
of such clusters are the following: dyspnea and edema, due to cardiac decompensa-
tion; amenorrhea and an abdominal mass, due to a tumor of the reproductive sys-
tem; and bradycardia and episodes of unconsciousness, due to the unstable heart
block that is called the Adams-Stokes syndrome.
2. The Clustering "Station"
The diagnostic "station" at which a group of entities are clustered can be a dis-
order, a derangement, or a pathoanatomic entity. In the examples cited in the pre-
ceding section, all of the manifestations were clustered as disorders. A group of
disorders may be combined at a clustering "station" that is usually a derangement,
or occasionally, a pathoanatomic entity. For example, the disorders of cardio-
megaly, congestive heart failure, and atrial fibrillation could be clustered with the
derangement rheumatic heart disease, or with the pathoanatomic entity, mitral
stenosis.
3. Monopathic vs Polypathic Reasoning
Diagnostic reasoning can be monopathic or polypathic in the attempt to assign
one cause or many causes as explanations for the observed phenomena. Although
the scientific principle of Occam's razor offers an intellectual parsimony that makes
monopathic explanations appealing, and although many clinicopathologic confer-
ences are directed toward identification of a single disease, clinical reality contains
many polypathic situations. In contrast to the idealized monopathy that may be
chosen for educational instruction, polypathy is often the rule rather than the ex-
ception in the work of a practicing clinician.
The question of whether, what, and when to cluster is an intricate part of inter-
mediate judgment in the diagnostic process, and a detailed analysis of cluster deci-
sions is beyond the scope of this discussion. In general, the decisions are affected
by the candidates available at the next "station" of the reasoning, beyond the "sta-
tion" at which the cluster is being considered. Thus, in one of the earlier examples,
when dyspnea and edema were considered for clustering into the disorder of car-
diac decompensation, a prerequisite to the cluster was the existence of a derange-
ment that would account for this disorder. If no such derangement were available
to serve as an "immediate cause" for the cardiac decompensation, some other clus-
ter and a suitable causal derangement might be sought. If no such derangement
could be found, a cluster at this diagnostic "station" would be untenable, and a
polypathic explanation would be sought for the manifestations.
The type of reasoning employed in a cluster decision is further illustrated in
the example that follows. To simplify the example, the initial manifestations have
been explained by a mixure of disorders, derangements, and other diagnostic
entities.
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FIG. 1. Venn diagram showing monopathic and polypathic diagnostic choices in the intersec-
tion of sets for the explanation of three manifestations. (For further details, see text.)
Suppose a patient's presenting manifestations are polyuria, tachypnea, and furuncles. We
could begin by contemplating a set of possible explanations for each of the individual
manifestations. For polyuria, the possible causes would include a renal derangement, diabetes
insipidus, diabetes mellitus, psychogenic polydipsia, or congestive heart failure (in a phase
of diuresis). For tachypnea, the explanations could be congestive heart failure, the hyper-
ventilation syndrome, a pulmonary disorder, a specific pathoanatomic pulmonary entity such
as staphylococcal pneumonia, or acidosis due either to excessive salicylate ingestion, to
a renal derangement, or to diabetes mellitus. The furuncles could be caused by "idiopathic"
staphylococcal infections, or by the patient's cutaneous predisposition due to external trauma,
steroid therapy, diabetic hyperglycemia, or hypogammaglobulinemia.
The Venn diagram of Fig. 1 shows the "intersection" of these three sets of explanations
and the common distributions for each explanation among the three sets. As noted in the
figure, some of the explanations are associated with only one manifestation and others
account for two manifestations; but only one-diabetes mellitus-accounts for all three.
The monopathic choice in this situation would, therefore, be diabetes mellitus.
This choice would be tempting for a diagnostician who considers only the evidence that
has been cited thus far. In clinical reality, of course, additional information would be available
to describe the patient's past history, the sequence and timing of events in the present
illness, the intake of medications, and the results of a test for glycosuria. A thoughtful
diagnostician using this additional evidence might decide that various polypathic diagnoses
explain the clinical situation better than the monopathic diabetes mellitus. The diagnosis
of diabetes mellitus becomes almost immediately untenable if a suitable test shows no hyper-
glycemia. As alternative explanations, in appropriate circumstances, a patient might have
a renal disease (producing acidosis) or a cardiac disease (producing congestive heart failure)
to explain the polyuria and tachypnea, and his occupation might have exposed him to
solvents or other agents that led to the furunculosis; during steroid treatment for diabetes
insipidus, a patient may have developed a cutaneous infection that led to a staphylococcal
pneumonia; finally, a patient with hypogammaglobulinemia, psychically traumatized by his
many medical ailments and treatments, might have developed the hyperventilation syndrome
and psychogenic polydipsia.
E. LOGICAL VS STATISTICAL REASONING
In the types of judgment that have just been described, a decision is reached
at each intellectual "station" in the reasoning. The result of the decision provides
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an appellatory name or an explanatory cause for a preceding entity or entities.
As background for each decision, the diagnostician assembles an array of data or
concepts pertinent to the issue at hand. He then "processes" or evaluates this infor-
mation by using various strategies to reach a conclusion that represents the deci-
sion. These strategies are based on intellectual mechanisms that can be logical or
statistical or both.
1. Logical Mechanisms
The term "logical" refers to a mechanism of reasoning in which a single decision
is accomplished by being decomposed into a series of sequential decisions, each
of which leads successively to another intermediate decision, and ultimately to the
conclusion. If the main decision is to choose the disease responsible for a particular
manifestation, a logical scheme of reasoning would decompose this decision into
successive decisions about manifestations, domains, disorders, derangements, and
so on until the responsible disease is cited in the final conclusion.
At each step in these procedures, the logician would like to attain complete
certainty for the associated decision. This complete certainty means that a candi-
date conclusion is either totally excluded (or "ruled out") from consideration, or
selected uniquely as the result. (In statistical terms the logician searches for a prob-
ability value of either 0 or 1.) This type of logical reasoning requires that all possi-
ble candidates be contemplated, that a group of "inclusions" be formed by eliminat-
ing the "exclusions," and that subsequent decisions be made to reduce the number
of included candidates if a unique choice has not yet been obtained. Thus, if deci-
sion A does not yield a unique selection from its group of "inclusions," decisions
B, C, and other branching decisions may be performed in an effort to eliminate
all but one member of the group. If a unique member cannot be isolated, the logi-
cian may then rank the remaining "inclusion" candidates according to qualitative
degrees of likelihood.
For example, let us consider diagnostic reasoning for a patient with a suprapubic
abdominal mass. The uterus and ovary can be excluded as the source of the mass
if the patient is male. Pregnancy is excluded if the patient is female, but above
or below the age in which reproduction can occur. Intestinal obstruction is ex-
cluded if the bowel movements have been regular. Beyond these exclusions of pos-
sible candidates, the remaining reasoning leads to likelihoods and unlikelihoods.
Distention of the bladder is unlikely if the patient is a young man without urinary
symptoms. Pregnancy is unlikely if the patient has had regular and recent menses.
A tumor or cyst is likely if the mass is hard and painless; a cancer is likely if
the mass is fixed.
At this stage of reasoning, and with the available information that has just been
listed, the diagnostician might not be able to go beyond the cited decisions. His
next step, therefore, might be to obtain additional data from such procedures as
rectal examination, bimanual pelvic examination, catheterization of bladder, and
sigmoidoscopy. If these procedures are inconclusive, the next step might be to order
suitable roentgenograms.
The foregoing description has illustrated two additional aspects of logical mecha-
nisms in diapostic reasoning: (a) each intermediate conclusion was accompanied
by a premise containing data specific to that decision and (b) the decisions that
could not be expressed with certainty were followed by a plan of action. (In this
instance, the planned action was to obtain additional data.) On the basis of these
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additional characteristics, we can now outline the logical process of diagnosis ac-
cording to four basic constituents: a "dissection" of the main decision into a se-
quence of intermediate decisions; the application of background data or concepts
specific to each intermediate decision; the search for certainty in each conclusion;
and the development of a plan of action for conclusions that are uncertain.
2. Statistical Mechanisms
In statistical mechanisms of diagnostic reasoning, the original decision is ap-
proached immediately, without "dissection" into components. The pertinent sub-
stantiating data are assembled directly, and the decision is made on the basis of
mathematical strategy and calculation. In this strategy, the background information
is cited arithmetically; the numbers are arranged into ratios from which "rates"
(or values of probability) are calculated; and the decision is based on the particular
candidate that gave either the highest or lowest values in the array of probabilities.
These probabilities can be calculated in a direct or indirect manner.
a. Direct probabilities. Let us reconsider the suprapubic abdominal mass cited
in the previous section. From results found in other patients with a suprapubic
abdominal mass, the diseases associated with the mass might have the following
statistical probabilities: 1/10 for distended bladder; 1/350 for carcinoma of blad-
der; 1/15 for fibroid; 1/20 for pregnancy; 1/150 for carcinoma of cervix; 1/200
for carcinoma of uterus; 1/420 for ovarian cyst; 1/12 for carcinoma of rectosig-
moid; 1/25 for carcinoma of ascending colon; etc. On the basis of these probabili-
ties the most likely immediate choice would be a distended bladder, and the least
likely would be an ovarian cyst.
Each of the cited calculations is called a "direct" probability, because it is based
on direct data for both the numerator and denominator of the calculated rate. Each
denominator was based on an observed, counted group of people who manifested
a suprapubic mass. Each of the numerators represented the number of those people
who had the corresponding disease. The result of the calculation was expressed
as a rate of disease per manifestation, and the input data were based on direct infor-
mation about that rate.
b. Indirect probabilities. The type of rate just cited cannot always be calculated
as a direct probability because the necessary information is seldom available. Clini-
cians often study a population of people with the same disease and calculate the
frequency rate for each manifestation of that disease, but the reverse procedure
is seldom done. Thus, we can readily find information about the frequency of
hemoptysis in patients with lung cancer, but few or no data exist about the fre-
quency of lung cancer in patients with hemoptysis. Another type of readily avail-
able information is collected by epidemiologists, and provides the mortality rates
of a disease in the general population. In these rates, the denominators are taken
from data of the census bureau, and the numerators are assembled from the data
entered nationally on death certificates. If we make the unwarranted assumption
(14) that these rates of diagnosis at death represent the true rates of disease, we
then have two types of information readily available: the rate of a manifestation
per disease, and the rate of that disease in the general population. Let us now
make the further (and also unwarranted) assumption that a third type of informa-
tion is available: the rate of the manifestation in thegeneralpopulation.
If the necessary assumptions be granted and the stated rates accepted, a statisti-
cal strategy called "Bayes theorem" will provide an indirect method for converting
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those three rates into the desired result of a rate of disease per manifestation. Ac-
cording to the Bayesian formula, the rate of disease per manifestation is obtained
by multiplying the rate of manifestation per disease times the rate of the disease
in the general population; and by then dividing this product by the rate of the
manifestation in the general population. Suppose, for example, that a suprapubic
abdominal mass occurred in 1/10 of patients with cancer of the rectosigmoid, and
in 1/100,000 of patients in the general population; and suppose further that cancer
of the rectosigmoid occurred in 1/120,000 of patients in the general population.
The Bayesian result for the probability of rectosigmoid cancer in a patient with
a suprapubic mass would then be
1 1
10 X 120,000 1
1 1~Z2
100,000
(The numbers here were deliberately contrived to yield the same result stated
earlier for the direct probability of this event).
The basic statistical validity of the Bayesian strategy has. often been criticized
(15-18), but the main scientific issue to be noted here is the unreliability of the
data used in the calculations. The rates of diseases and of manifestations in the
general population are not determined accurately enough for scientific credence
to be placed in their values (14). To overcome this objection to data from the
general population, Bayes-ophilic diagnosticians have used a population that can
be accurately observed and counted: the patients at hospitals. With this popula-
tional transfer, the numbers used as the denominator and as one numerator in
the Bayesian calculation are the rates of manifestations and of diseases in the popu-
lation of all people examined in a hospital, or in the patients seen by a particular
service of that hospital.
This choice of population provides reliable data, but the results cannot be ap-
plied beyond the confines of that hospital or of that service. As changes occur
in nomenclature and concepts of disease, in tactics of "screening" for disease, in
accuracy and availability of diagnostic tests, and in patterns of patient referrals, the
rates of manifestations and of diseases will fluctuate enormously in any population
of hospitalized patients. The "established" rates of manifestation per disease will
be altered accordingly (3, 14). Moreover, for a particular service at a hospital,
the rate of a manifestation per disease or per patient, and the rate of a disease
per patient will rise or fall according to whether the service is medical or surgical,
general or specialized, and ward or private (3). In one of the few instances in
which an apparently "successful" Bayesian diagnostic procedure was tested at a
hospital (19) cther than the one at which the procedure was developed (20), the
"success" was not confirmed.
To ascertain that the clinical population has not changed in any of the critical
variables just cited, Bayesian diagnosticians can regularly assemble data for the
three rates that are necessary for the calculations: manifestation per disease, mani-
festation per patient, and disease per patient. If these rates remain unaltered with
the passage of time, the values might be reasonably used for the indirect calculation
of the rate of disease per manifestation. On the other hand, if this type of careful
monitoring is to be established for acquiring data, the diagnostician might just as
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easily, and perhaps more accurately, assemble the direct information about the
rate of disease per manifestation, and avoid the indirect Bayesian calculations.
3. Statistical Deficiencies
Regardless of the reliability of the numerical data, and regardless of whether
the probabilities are calculated by direct or indirect methods, the cited statistical
mechanisms of reasoning have several insurmountable defects as guidelines to clini-
cal diagnosis.
a. The rate of error. In using rates of probability as a basis for decision, a statis-
tician tries to minimize his risk of being wrong, but he is constantly willing to
accept a certain rate of error in his deliberations. For example, a P value of 0.01,
which is usually regarded as a high level of "statistical significance" for inferential
decisions, means essentially that the statistician is willing to be wrong once in every
100 times that he makes the decision. At a P value of 0.05, which is the customary
level of "statistical significance," the statistician is willing to be wrong once in every
20 times.
The rate of error that is acceptable to a statistician is intolerably high for doctors
and patients. Patients would have no confidence in doctors, and doctors would
have no confidence in their own work, if the doctor were blithely willing to be
wrong in as many as 5% of the diverse decisions made during clinical reasoning.
A thoughtful clinician recognizes that his reasoning may sometimes be incorrect
and that his rate of error may often be higher than 5%, but he does not deliberately
begin his rational activities with a complacent acceptance of any rate of error. In
an era of science, the diagnostician wants to be exactly right, rather than approxi-
mately; and he is interested in scientific specificity and precision, rather than in
statistical arithmetic and probabilities.
b. Atypical clinical situations. Just as a good computer program is evaluated
by the way it manages exceptional rather than customary situations, a good scheme
of diagnostic strategy should also be geared to management of the unusual or atypi-
cal. By this criterion of assessment, no existing statistical strategy can receive a
passing grade. The statistical procedures are not prepared to cope with at least
three of the most common types of "uncommon" event in diagnosis: the asymp-
tomatic disease, the disease with bizarre complications, and the patient with multi-
ple diseases.
As modern clinicians perform such screening tests as electrocardiography, chest
X-ray, urinalysis, and cervical "Pap" smears to detect disease in asymptomatic pa-
tients, the incentive for each test is surely not a calculation of probabilities that
a wholly asymptomatic patient has heart disease, tuberculosis, diabetes mellitus,
or cervical cancer. Even if reliable statistical data could be collected about the
prevalence of these diseases in asymptomatic patients, the diagnoses would still
rest on the results of the tests, not on the arithmetical probabilities.
A separate problem is created by occasional patients with unusual or bizarre
complications. Suppose a patient with an intestinally asymptomatic carcinoma of
the rectum develops metastases to the pericardium, causing a large effusion and
the presenting symptom of dyspnea due to pericardial tamponade. From the physi-
cal examination, chest X-ray, and paracentesis of pericardial fluid, the clinical diag-
nostician could readily infer the diagnosis. The statistical diagnostician would be
left to explore numerical data, if any exist, about the probability of cancer of the
rectum in patients with dyspnea.
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Finally, the frequent use of a plethora of technologic tests has led to the realiza-
tion that polypathic patients (with multiple diseases) frequently occur in modern
medicine. The current statistical procedures make no provision for such patients.
Thus, according to the statistical strategies, a patient with rectal bleeding might
have either hemorrhoids or a cancer of the rectum or diverticula-but he could
not have (as some patients do) two of these diseases or all three.
c. The absence of correlated explanation. As noted earlier, a critical role of
diagnostic reasoning is not merely to identify diseases, but to explain manifestations.
If the clinician does not follow the scientific pathway of correlating each "imme-
diate cause" with its effect, he runs the risk of arriving at the right answers to
the wrong questions. His conclusions may be accurate but impertinent (21), giving
him results that are statistically satisfactory but scientifically defective, diagnosti-
cally inadequate, and therapeutically hazardous. Since statistical approaches in
diagnosis are calculated to identify but not to correlate or to explain, they will
inevitably reduce a clinician's effectiveness in meeting his daily challenges in patient
care.
d. Clinical specificity vs general probability. Another major deficiency of current
statistical approaches to diagnosis arises not from the validity of Bayesian inference
in the calculations, not from the reliability of the basic data, and not from any
of the features that have just been cited, but from the statistical necessity for using
data that are often inappropriate for the calculations.
Let us assume, for the patient cited in earlier examples, that we had obtained
reliable data about the occurrence rates of rectosigmoid cancer and of a suprapubic
mass in the general population. The assumption is seldom valid, of course, since
doctors can rarely, if ever, arrange for everyone in a population to be examined
with procedures that are suitably applied and standardized. Nevertheless, for the
sake of continuing the discussion, let us assume that the basic statistical data are
reliable, and that the rate of rectosigmoid cancer in the general population is truly
1/120,000, and that the rate of suprapubic masses is truly 1/100,000. Let us fur-
ther assume that the rate of a suprapubic mass in patients with rectosigmoid cancer
has also been reliably determined and found to be 1/10. Let us finally assume
that the probability of rectosigmoid cancer per suprapubic mass has been calculated
by Bayesian methods or obtained directly, and that this value is truly 1/12.
Are these data, although reliable, really pertinent for the diagnostician's deci-
sion? Is he concerned with the statistical rate of events in either a general popula-
tion or a diseased population-or is he trying to evaluate the phenomena observed
in a particular patient? If the patient with the suprapubic mass were a 47-year-old
white woman who had had diabetes mellitus since childhood, and who currently
had a creamy vaginal discharge, would the clinician want to have data about the
rate of rectosigmoid cancer in the general population, or would the clinician want
the denominator population to consist of 47-year-old female juvenile diabetics with
creamy vaginal discharges? Would he want to know about the rates of suprapubic
mass in all people with rectosigmoid cancer, or in rectosigmoidally carcinomatous
patients who also have the same demographic and clinical attributes as the patient
at hand?
If the more specific types of statistical data were available in numbers large
enough to be meaningful, the clinician would obviously prefer to use such data.
But such specific data are generally not available or when available, not abun-
dant-and so the imprecision of general statistics may be deliberately accepted
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in order to make use of the quantification. To this indictment, a thoughtful statisti-
cian might reply that a scientific insistence on specificity would prevent statistics
from ever being used in human reasoning, because a pedantic scientist could always
find a descriptive attribute that was omitted from the assembled statistics. This
issue of specificity thus leads to the core problem in the use of statistical data in
clinical medicine.
Since diagnostic reasoning is always concerned with a particular patient, and
since no two people are ever exactly the same, can any collection of statistics ever
be applied to the individuality of a particular person? An antistatistical nihilist would
probably answer this last question with a vigorous "No." The same answer would
probably also be given, with or without antistatistical bias, by an "old school" clini-
cian who resolutely believes that diagnostic judgment is, now and forever, an un-
definable and indescribable act of intuitive artistry.
This rejection of statistics is probably warranted if we assume that statistics will
continue to be used in the unscientific manner portrayed in the previous examples.
On the other hand, if suitable specificity can be brought into both the statistical
data and the clinical reasoning, a scientific clinician of the future can use statistics
as a source of enormous illumination and assistance. To achieve this goal, however,
requires a more effective recognition than has hitherto been given to the different
types of decisions made by clinicians, and to the types of statistics needed for the
decisions.
4. The Targets of Decision
The true value of statistics in clinicial reasoning has been obscured by a failure
to distinguish the two different targets-intellectual and managerial-at which the
decisions are aimed (22). The choice of a diagnostic name is an intellectual deci-
sion; the choice of a diagnostic test or of a mode of treatment is a managerial
decison. In an intellectual decision, the final result is an identification or evaluation
of an observed entity; in a managerial decision, the final result is a plan of action.
To select a mode of management for a patient, a clinician must rely on previous
statistics; the only way in which he can customarily justify his decision is from
a careful analysis of the results obtained in previous patients. He may be able to
enumerate those results quantitatively, or he may document them only with recol-
lections of "past experience," but the assessment is essentially a statistical proce-
dure (3). In the intellectual choice of a diagnostic name, however, the clinician
need not rely on statistical data. Regardless of what happened in previous patients,
he can often justify his decision from the results obtained in a well-chosen para-
clinical test. Thus, to select treatment for a patient with hemoptysis and lung can-
cer, the clinician must contemplate the statistical results of previous treatment in
such patients; but in choices of diagnosis, if the bronchoscopic biopsy reveals an
epidermoid carcinoma, a patient with hemoptysis has been shown to have lung
cancer, regardless of the diagnoses suggested either by unquantified "past experi-
ence" or by statistical enumerations.
The cardinal defect of current statistical approaches to diagnosis, therefore, is
not contained in any of the flaws that have already been discussed. The basic prob-
lem is that statistical tactics are being used for the wrong type of decision. Statisti-
cal data provide a necessary and vital background for managerial decisions in clini-
cal science, but not for intellectual decisions. If the intellectual decision is the type
of appraisal that produces such terms of evaluation as "good," "early," "improv-
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ing," and "unsuccessful," the decision depends not on statistics, but on the specific
criteria used for the appraisals (23). If the result of the intellectual decision is
a diagnostic identification, then the decision depends on specific paraclinical evi-
dence of the disease, or on eclectic criteria for establishing a diagnosis from various
combinations of evidence (3, 23). If a diagnosis can not be conclusively estab-
lished, however, the clinician's next move is toward an action decision, in which
he either seeks additional information that will produce a conclusive diagnosis,
or he plans a mode of therapy that seems optimal for managing the uncertainty.
Statistical approaches to diagnosis cannot be clinically satisfactory, therefore,
because the data and the calculations used in the statistics are not appropriate for
scientific precision in identifying disease, and are not directed at a managerial deci-
sion in planning either treatment or a further diagnostic work-up. When scientific
precision is obtainable from a paraclinical test, the clinician will order that test
whenever possible, and will heed its biologic information more than any statistical
probabilities. When a precise diagnostic conclusion is not obtainable from the rea-
soning and the tests, the clinician will want to review statistics not about diagnosis,
but about further management of the patient.
Many of the current statistical strategies in diagnosis are based on the naive
belief that clinical activities have remained unchanged during the past century, and
that the diagnostic process today is essentially the same as the "physical diagnosis"
of the past, with clinical symptoms and signs as the main evidence that is converted
into inferences about morphologic diseases. In that old fashion of "physical diagno-
sis," the clinician had very few procedures of paraclinical examination, and had
to make his morphologic inferences as best he could, essentially devoid of ancillary
tests. Such a clinician would gladly have welcomed any help he could get from
Bayesian or other statistical strategies that might assist the intellectual transfer from
clinical manifestations to morphologic diagnoses.
But this type of purely clinical "physical diagnosis" has been drastically altered
by the availability of the roentgen ray, the biopsy, the endoscope, the myriads of
laboratory tests, the surgical explorations, and all the other technologic procedures
of modern medicine. In living patients, these procedures can identify morphologic
diseases with precise specificity, and can demonstrate the many functional or chem-
ical ailments that cannot be shown morphologically. Concomitant with all these
changes in diagnosis, other advances in technology have provided a powerful thera-
peutic armamentarium that has drastically altered the types of management avail-
able as "action" to follow the diagnostic decisions of the past.
If statistics are to be helpful to a clinician who works with the technology of
modern clinical science, the help will surely not come from applying new forms
of statistical reasoning to archaic forms of clinical practice. Since the inherent valid-
ity of statistics is greatest for managerial rather than for intellectual decisions, the
most potent role of statistics in diagnostic medicine today is not in the intellectual
identification of disease, but in the managerial choice of diagnostic tests. With so
much of the contemporary diagnostic process devoted to the "work-up," rather
than to the reasoning, the selection of suitable tests has become a major new chal-
lenge for the clinician, and a major new hazard for the patient.
Many of the tests are dangerous, uncomfortable, and expensive (24). Many are
superfluous, redundant, or inaccurate (25). They have been spawned promiscu-
ously, without intensive regulation and often without suitable assessment of their
worth, and they are often ordered thoughtlessly, without their results being sub-
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jected to careful evaluation. To improve this lamentable situation, diagnosticians
today are in desperate need of statistical assistance not for performing sterile calcu-
lations about the names of diseases, but for choosing the tests wisely, and for plan-
ning the diagnostic work-up effectively. A diagnostician needs statistical guidance
to determine, at each stage of the diagnostic work-up, the costs, the risks, and
the value of each diagnostic procedure.
For this guidance, a clinician could cogently and gratefully make use of appro-
priate statistical data. But no such data are available. The statistical approach to
diagnostic reasoning has been devoted only to identifying "output" diseases from
"input" manifestations. And the stages of the work-up have been delineated neither
by clinicians nor by statisticians, so that the appropriate data cannot be obtained
even if investigators had the inquiring incentive and suitable facilities. We cannot
determine what are the values and hazards of ordering a test at one station in
the reasoning, in contrast to another station, because the stations have not been de-
lineated and correlated with the results of the tests. We cannot determine whether
a group of tests should be ordered in sequence or as a single "battery," because
the clinical and paraclinical constituents of a diagnostic sequence have not been
stipulated.
If current statistical strategies in diagnosis are unacceptable, and if the stages
of reasoning in the diagnostic work-up require a branching delineation of logical
stations and decisions, then a clinician who wants to achieve effective diagnosis
and effective statistics in modern medicine must arrange to specify the ingredients,
the sequence, and the reasoning of those decisions. The discussions thus far have
been concerned with the intellectual contents and intermediate strategies of the
decisions. The next paper, which concludes this series, will deal with the algo-
rithms, flow-charts, decision tables, and other tactics that can be used to specify
those procedures.
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